From: Stephen Cohen
Subject: Kargil Crisis
Date: Tuesday, June 15, 1999 2:26 PM
DEAR FRIEND;
The Kargil crisis is the third "big" crisis in South Asia since 1987. The Brasstacks crisis of that
year was the last time India and Pakistan could have fought a major conventional war without
going nuclear--or at least that was the calculation on the Indian side. It led, I think, to the
speeding up of the Pakistan program (and both AQ Khan's and Zia's statements to the press that
Pakistan had the bomb or was close to it), and perhaps to the Indian decision to prepare for tests.
The 1990 crisis was probably the first nuclear crisis, as both countries might have been able to
assemble one or more nuclear weapons. It was even more so a nuclear crisis in that some
Pakistanis concluded that the Indians were deterred from attacking the training camps on the
Pakistani side by the threat of a nuclear war. Certainly, some Indians believed that they were being
threatened, which may have only accelerated the Indian program.
Kargil represents the first major crisis in an environment of declared nuclear capability. We don't
know if either or both sides have actually deployed such weapons, or if they have been readied for
use, but the Kargil operations are certainly carried out in a nuclear shadow.
I visited Kargil in 1969 and have traveled over the contested road. As LTG Raghavan notes in
the article below, it has always been a place where the two armies have stood face to face, and
have lobbed artillery and insults back and forth. The Kargil population is certainly not "alienated"
as were the Valley Kashmiris, but the road is vital for India to control, not least because it
supplies Ladakh, where India has its own separate territorial/border dispute with China. Cutting
off resupply for Ladakh would be a serious matter given the need to replenish food and other
supplies over the brief summer season (the same is true for Kargil itself). My own views on the
conflict are in two op ed pieces, just published, one in the Asian and US editions of the Wall
Street Journal, the other in the Washington Times (forthcoming). I revert to my earlier belief that
a larger process is necessary to begin to resolve these conflicts, and that it is in the interest of both
India and Pakistan (especially the latter, since it is faces so many domestic problems) to start
down that road. The US and other countries can provide directions, and at times offer a lift, but
they'll have to decide whether the considerable possible gains outweigh the palpable and
immediate losses.
Two pieces are below: one is by a very fine Pakistani lawyer, Ahmer Bilal Soofi, the other by
LTG V. Raghavan, a former director of military operations of the Indian Army. Both are
thoughtful and serious people, they bring to this issue a very important professional understanding
and competence. The articles appear in two of the most respected magazines, the Friday 'Times of
Pakistan (who's editor, Najam Sethi, was so sensationally harassed by the Pakistan government in
the last month), and Frontline, a publication of the Hindu family of newspapers.
URLs are BROOKINGS: http://www.brook.edu/fp/projects/south_asia.htm
THE FRIDAY TIMES http://www.thefridaytimes.com/
and FRONTLINE; http://www.the-hindu.com/fline/fl1612/16120160.htm
International law on hostilities at LOC The Friday Times, June 11-17, 1999
Ahmer Bilal Soofi
The Kargil sector is witnessing bloody artillery duels between the Indian and Pakistan armies.
India is also engaged, on its side of the Line of Control, in the biggest military operation against
Kashmiri mujahideen, who have captured some strategic locations along certain ridgelines and
now threaten India's strategic Srinagar-Leh Road. To secure that link, India's main Line of
Communication (L of C) towards Ladakh and Siachin, Indian military has for the first time
inducted combat aircraft in its counter-insurgency operations against the mujahideen. Accusations
and counter-accusations have been traded between the two countries since Pakistan downed two
Indian MiG aircraft, which had intruded in its air space. This article attempts to view the situation
in the perspective of international law. Its operative part is based on press reports that are in the
public domain.
- The Line of Control is delimited only up to a certain point. That point is short of the
glacial terrain of Siachin.
- Recently, there has been a sudden surge of activity on the Indian side of the LOC in Kashmir,
where the mujahideen have successfully captured certain positions and now threaten the Indian L
of C along Srinagar-Leh Road. Several failures through ground offensives to dislodge the fighters,
have forced India to employ combat aircraft to "soften up" the resistance.
- India alleges that the freedom fighters currently holding positions on mountaintops are
Pakistan-backed mercenaries. Pakistan denies the charge and terms them Kashmiri freedom
fighters.
LOC violations
The LOC is not an international border. It is an interim arrangement arrived at between Indian and
Pakistan through the 1972 Simla Agreement. It represents the military positions of both sides in
Kashmir. Both sides, under the Agreement, undertook to respect the LOC but the line has no
bearing on the legal position of both the states on the issue of Kashmir. In other words, the
Agreement has deliberately removed for both states the temptation to acquire territory through
force in Kashmir. Thus gaining territory by Pakistan will have no bearing on Pakistan's legal
position on Kashmir. That is why Pakistan will have little motivation to acquire territory by
crossing the LOC.
However, if the armed forces of either state cross the LOC, then it will be a clear violation of the
Agreement and will be viewed as an international wrong. Both states seem to know that and,
therefore, despite some provocation, Pakistan has stuck to defensive positions on its side of the
line.
India has alleged the presence of Pakistani "regulars" among the fighters but has failed to provide
any concrete evidence of such involvement. However, a recent statement by caretaker Indian
Prime Minister, A B Vijpayee, reveals that while New Delhi still blames Pakistan for supporting
the fighters it has backtracked on initial allegations that Pakistan army had either crossed the LOC
or mounted the operation to gain territory. Given the state practice, statements, official handouts
and other evidence it is clear that Pakistan has not committed any violation of the LOC. Freedom
fighters
The strongest allegation by India is that Pakistan is supporting the insurgents, some of whom are
Pakistani nationals. Under principles of international law, a state is responsible for the acts of its
individuals if they are (a) imputable to the state; (b) their activities result in a harm. If India can
successfully establish at an international level the linkage of the freedom fighters through objective
evidence with Pakistan then Pakistan will find it difficult to escape state responsibility for their
actions. However, if India cannot establish such linkage then it would be blamed for trying to
quash by force the right of self determination of the people of Kashmir. That would bring
international condemnation. It seems that blaming Pakistan is a gambit to avoid just such an
eventuality.
Aircraft downed
Two MiG aircraft were downed by Pakistan on their side of LOC, when these combat aircraft
either deliberately intruded or strayed into Pakistan's side of the LOC. Normally, during times of
lesser tension, aircraft straying into other state's territory are not fired upon and are let off with a
warning. However, in the present situation at the LOC any country would have perceived a
combat aircraft to be an imminent threat. Therefore, the MiGs were shot down in self-defense
when they approached Pakistani positions. Under the regime of international law that regulates
aspects of an armed conflict - referred to as Geneva-Hague Conventions - the present situation
can be likened to a full-fledged armed conflict, even if localised. That is why Pakistan's act of
shooting down the MiGs was not condemned by the international community. Although,
technically speaking, Pakistan's side of the LOC is not its air space, Pakistan is, nevertheless,
responsible for the defense of the air space of AJ & K. Therefore, any violation of that air space
would be perceived as a threat to the Pakistan army stationed there.
World opinion and legality of war
Under principles of international law, in a situation of conflicting allegations, the opinion or
condemnation by other State Parties plays a decisive role in determining as to which particular act
was against international law. The world opinion so far has been muted. The UN, through its
secretary-general, has advised restraint on both sides. No specific act during the ongoing conflict
by Pakistan or for that matter by India has been condemned out-rightly at any international forum.
Certain states have consciously abstained to determine the 'wrong' and have instead urged control
and restraint. Politically this is so because no one wants to place blame on one party for fear that
it might strengthen the other party's resolve to strike back. Legally, it is difficult to find clear
evidence of who is really at fault, and which allegations are more substantiated. Artillery duels and
civilian casualties form a chain process of attack and counter-attack, in which each military
response is said to be in either anticipatory self-defense or a measure of reprisal in response to an
earlier attack. Therefore, presently, from the perspective of international law, it is difficult to affix
responsibility for these hostilities. The statement by the US State Department that Pakistan should
withdraw infiltrators is diplomatically damaging but from the standpoint of international law still
falls short of condemnation. For its part, Pakistan has condemned the State Department's
statement and not without good reason, either.
UN Observer Mission
Pakistan has come up with a very fair suggestion that the UN Observer Mission should be allowed
to monitor the LOC to prove or disprove the allegation that the mujahideen are Pakistan-backed.
India disagrees, but continues with its allegations. The UN Observer Mission, set up under article
29 of the UN Charter, is confined to observe and receive reports of violations from both sides of
the LOC before passing them onto the Secretariat of the Security Council. Its effectiveness has
been reduced since 1971 as only Pakistan reports the violations and India does not. The reason
India opposes the UN Observer Mission because of its emphasis on bilateralism under the Simla
Agreement. It, therefore, does not want to involve the UN in the issue. However, India should
take comfort in the Simla Agreement that clearly saves the 'recognized positions' of both the
parties on the issue.
It is useful to clarify that contrary to general perception, the present UN Observer Mission is not a
peacekeeping force. A peacekeeping force is more intrusive in its operations and virtually
separates two combatants by placing its armed contingent in the middle.
However, if India is confident that the freedom fighters holding positions in the Kargil sector on
its side of the LOC are Pakistan-backed, then it should welcome the suggestion of monitoring the
LOC by the present UN Observer Mission or by a peacekeeping mission that the UN
secretary-general is willing to constitute provided both India and Pakistan agree. Such an
arrangement could become a verifying mechanism to determine who is actually violating the LOC
and present a more objective picture before the international community.
FRONTLINE, Volume 16 - Issue 12, June 05 - 18, 1999
A turning point in Kashmir
The Kargil conflict has long-term security implications for India and Pakistan.
V.R. RAGHAVAN
In the Lahore Declaration signed in February 1999 by the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan,
one of the paragraphs in the preamble reads, "the nuclear dimension of the security environment
of the two countries adds to their responsibility for avoidance of conflict between the two
countries..." It goes on to emphasise that "an environment of peace and security is in the supreme
national interest of both sides." The Memorandum of Understanding signed at the time went a
long way in identifying specific measures that India and Pakistan would take to implement the
Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) that already exist and even review them for improvement.
Within three months of the Lahore high point, relations between the two countries have reached a
nadir. Kargil, a small district headquarter town situated between the remote Zanskar and the
Ladakh ranges, has become the cause celebre in the tragic and avoidable crashing down of hopes
generated at Lahore.
During my years in the Kargil area, I was once asked to inaugurate a local festival. A favourite
sport of the Kargilis is archery. The young and old were enthusiastically engaged in shooting at
small wooden pegs stuck on mounds of earth a long distance a way. A venerable elder asked the
D.C. sahib sitting next to me to shoot a few arrows at the targets. The gentle bespoke bureaucrat
went up to the mike and announced in inimitable Urdu, "I do not shoot. In Kargil we often get
shot at and that is enough for me." That remark was received with great applause and
appreciation for the understanding he showed of the situation in Kargil. It has remained a
perennial target for the Pakistan Army to practise its gunnery. In an indescribably beautiful area of
orchards, green meadows and water mills, there are villages which have to be vacated year after
year when the Pakistani guns rain down death.
The Pakistani military's obsession with Kargil is a favourite subject of speculation over fragrant
tea in the town and somewhat stronger beverages in Army messes. Since 1947, the Indian Army
has fought some of its toughest combat actions in this area. A few months after Independence,
Pakistani troops and irregulars entered Kargil and branched out south to the Zoji-La Pass and east
to Leh. They were stopped at the pass by some very brave fighters and prevented from entering
into the Srinagar bowl. As for Leh, skirmishes took place within an hour's drive from it. It
required the vision of Gen. K.S. Thimayya to plan the recapture of Kargil. He worked a column of
troops into Leh through what is today Himachal Pradesh. This march over high passes and
difficult mountains took months. Thimayya simultaneously put into effect a master stroke by
getting an airstrip ready at Leh and forcing the unprecedented entry of tanks on the Zoji-La. In
modern Indian military history, the link-up at Kargil by the two column s from Leh and Zoji-La is
a memorable event. It needed one year to complete as the troops had to wait out the winter of
1947.
Kargil's relief was short-lived. While the Pakistanis were pushed out of the town, they held the
heights overlooking it. From 1948 to 1965 the Kargilis lived under the direct sight of Pakistanis,
who rained artillery fire without any pretext every other day. During winter Kargil and Leh are cut
off by snow from the rest of the country. They need to be stocked up for winter since the road
remains snow-bound for seven months. Unlike Leh and Srinagar, Kargil did not have an air link.
The small air strip at Kargil was in view of the Pakistani posts on the hills. Aircraft would land
there by running the gauntlet of fire. The Pakistani artillery fire made the road that brought
supplies to Kargil and Leh unusable for long periods. In 1965, on the night the war started, Indian
infantry charged up to clear the Pakistanis from the hilltops around Kargil. One of the battalion
commanders was advised to wait for a day for preparations to be made for the attack. He attacked
the same nigh t saying, "I do not want to gain time and lose the blood of my men." These gains,
made with a loss of lives, were undone when, as part of the Tashkent Accord, the captured hills
were returned to Pakistan - with disastrous results for the people of Kargil . In 1971, the hills
were recaptured and the Pakistanis were pushed back farther than in 1965. Notwithstanding this,
there are some stretches of the Srinagar-Leh road that are still visible to Pakistani posts from a
considerable distance. These posts attempt to fire at the road, but with little effect.
During the period of Pakistan-inspired militancy in the Valley, Kargil has remained adamantly
uncooperative with the militant outfits. The people of Kargil have not sided with militancy. They
have showed no interest in Pakistan's designs on Kashmir. Kargil is also an overwhelmingly Shia
Muslim area. Other than isolated instances of aberrations, Kargil has not supported the militants
and their activities. Pakistan's attempts to push in infiltrators through this sector have always
failed with heavy losses in men and equipment to them. As a consequence and perhaps because of
its unwillingness to support militancy, Pakistan has intensified its attacks on Kargil town and the
villages around it in the last few years, with considerable damage to property and life in the
area.
Since the Pakistani military cannot reach Kargil by ground, it has attempted since 1971 and
particularly in the last few years to do so with its guns. It has targeted the homes, cattle and fields
of the Kargilis. When that did not work and its other avenues of entry into the Valley were
effectively curtailed, it has now attempted a new method. In the process, it has raised the
threshold of its military involvement in Kashmir to new and dangerous levels. The intrusion in
May 1999 in the Kargil sector, with militants armed to hitherto unattainable levels, portrays an
altogether different approach. This time the intention is apparently to take and hold territory in
Jammu and Kashmir and invite an Indian response. The selection of the area, the timing of t he
intrusion, the extent of area taken and the preparedness of the intruding groups are unique. They
are also indicative of the planning, preparation and combat support made available to the
intruders. These are not irregulars of the kind so far seen in the Valley. The Indian suspicion that
they are Pakistani military personnel with an irregular patina is therefore not misplaced.
THE choice of the Kargil sector for the major intrusion requires some explaining. This is the only
sector on the Line of Control (LoC) where Pakistani posts have an advantage of higher positions.
Elsewhere on the LoC, they are at a disadvantage since the dominating heights are held by the
Indian military. Pakistan's military has a long history of attempting a direct and frontal approach to
military operations. It has abiding faith in its ability to make deep inroads and cut off road arteries.
It tried it in Chhamb and Akhnoor in 1965 and 1971 but, despite initial successes, failed in its
objective. In Kargil the same operational philosophy leads it to believe that it can cut the
Srinagar-Leh road. This it believes will land into its hands a large chunk of territory, which can be
used to force an unfavourable bargain on India.
The Kargil sector extends to about 150 km, with Drass at one end and Batalik at the other. The
Pakistani intrusions cover over 100 km of the Kargil sector. The intruders have occupied areas
that were not held by Indian troops. Moving such large numbers in such a large area - even
though the extent of intrusion is not large - requires preparation and planning. Irregulars cannot
manage such operations without general staff and logistics support. That can only come from an
Army - that of Pakistan.
Lt. Gen. V.R. Raghavan, a former Director-General of Military Operations,is Director of the
Delhi Policy Group.
Date: Tue, 15 Jun 1999 18:32:52 -0400 (EDT)
From: Sreenath Sreenivasan
Sender: ss221@columbia.edu
To: saja@columbia.edu
Subject: Francois Gautier on Kargil and other wars
From SAJA E-mail Discussion List Dissecting American Media Now
Info: www.saja.org/lists
Few foreign correspondents in South Asia seem to write as much for the LOCAL press as
Francois Gautier, the correspondent of Le Figaro. Here's the latest piece. Any reax?
//sree.net//
Hindustan Times June 15, 1999
Losing the PR battle By Francois Gautier Francois Gautier is the India correspondent for Le
Figaro, Paris.
I have just come back from Kargil. I am not an Indian, but a foreign correspondent, but I have
lived long in this country - I am even married to an Indian - and I love India dearly, in spite of all
its faults.
I have been a number of times with the army in ground operations in Kashmir and I have always
thought that the Indian army is a well-trained, professionally outfit, with educated, dedicated and
articulate officers. Even in the case of Kargil, where the army intelligence was caught napping, I
have no doubt that if the political leadership gives it a free hand, they will be able to dislodge the
militants. It will not be as easy as it was made out; it will take more time than first thought and it
will be a bloody battle. The militants are well entrenched, well-equipped and they have the
invaluable strategic advantage of being on heights.
I feel though, that even if that battle is ultimately won and the infiltrators go back dead or alive to
the Pakistan side of the LoC (what's wrong with the Defence Minister's offer of safe passage?
What's important is that they leave, regardless of the means!), there is one war which India has
been constantly losing since 1947. It is the public relations battle. Look at this particular case. Not
only is Pakistan the aggressor - it trained, armed, financed the Kashmiri separatists, put them
under the command of Pakistani soldiers in civil and Afghan Mujahideens and pushed them into
Indian held territory - but now it is able to portray itself as a peacemaker (and blackmail the world
with the threat of a nuclear war). What an irony! I have been listening to the BBC and CNN and
that is exactly what they have said in the last few days. I quote Lise Doucet of the BBC: "In spite
of Pakistan's peace overtures (the proposal to send Aziz and the release of the airman), India is
proceeding with its military offensive".... And India has not only lost the propaganda battle in this
"near war" of today, but lost it the three preceding Indo-Pak wars, all of which lost initiated by
Pakistanis. Even in 1971, when India had to intervene after Pakistan committed a terrible
genocide in what is now known as Bangladesh, the United States took the side of the
Pakistan.
Twenty-eight years later, whatever the Indian government says, Western public opinion is still
not on its side, as Kashmir proves. For 15 years, various Indian governments have been saying
that Pakistan was sponsoring, arming and training Kashmiri militants. In the beginning, we foreign
journalists were a bit sceptical, but after some years, it became obvious to a few of us that it was
the truth, because it made sense, it was logical - we were even, shown aerial photographs of
training camps inside Pakistan. Yet today, if we dare to mention in our dispatches on Kashmir
"the Pakistan-trained Kashmiri militants", some of our editors in Paris, London or New York will
immediately correct the text to: "India says that the Kashmiri militants are backed by Pakistan".
After 15 years the Indian Government has not been able to convince the western press of the truth
of its accusations against Pakistan, which has a very sad record in terms of human rights.
One obvious reason of course is that the major media players in India - the BBC, CNN, the big
wire agencies: AP, Reuters, AFP - are the ones who are setting the rules of the game and for
years they have stuck to their stories: "India says that: "These dispatches are the ones which
fashion the opinions not only of our editors in Paris or London, but also of our politicians. And
we can do nothing about it.
Mr Vajpayee could take a lesson or two from China. This country has probably one of the worst
human rights records of the 20th century: it killed nearly a million innocent Tibetans and Mao
Zedong wiped out in Chinese camps at least three times that number of its own people. Since the
communists took power, China has been under the rule of a ruthless dictatorship - the tenth
anniversary of Tianenmen has just reminded us of that fact. But look: not only the West is doing
business with China, but it is a very fashionable place to visit today - China gets ten times the
amount of tourists that India receives! On top of that, China does not take any nonsense from
anybody, whether it is the Christian missionaries, who would have never dared to do in China one
thousandth of what they have done in India, or the western press, which is not even allowed to go
out of Beijing without the government's permission.
Not that India should become like China! In spite of its anarchy, this country is a beacon of
pro-Western democracy in Asia - and it is very sad that the United States is incapable of
recognising that simple fact. India should never lose this great tolerance this inner goodwill of
India, which made it so great. But at the same time, it has to devise a code of ethics for the
western press here, which often reports only on the negative aspects of India: its catastrophes, its
wars, its poverty, the City of Joy... The Indian press and government should stop setting its
standards by what the Western media think or say about India.
During the troubles of last year with the Christians, for instance, very few of us bothered to
mention that India allowed all persecuted minorities of this planet to find shelter in it over twenty
centuries - including the Christians - who have shamelessly exploited that tolerance. Witness what
they did in Goa! There is an element of Gandhian naivete in Mr Vajpayee. It was wonderful of the
Prime Minister to go to Pakistan by bus to embrace Sharif - but generosity is best suited to strong
people who can afford to munificent. For while Pakistan was talking peace, it was quietly sending
across the Line of Control its infiltrators. India must learn to be a little more ruthless.
Finally, the Prime Minister should realise that India, at least the leaders of the Congress who
shaped India's destiny at independence, accepted the absurd, monstrous and illogical rule of the
partition, which was devised by the British to divide a wonderful nation. For the division of India
on religious lines is an aberration, it created a State-Pakistan - whose only "raison d'etre" is Islam
and its only preoccupation, the hatred of Hindu India which it has inherited from Mughal times.
Kashmir is the visible result of that monstrosity, the living proof of the falsehood of that division.
And it is a dead end a problem without solution.
India feels rightly that Kashmir has always been part of its territory - once it was a centre of
Hinduism, then of Buddhism and at the beginning of the century there were several hundred
thousands of Kashmiri Pandits who have now fled, thanks to the terror tactics of the Muslim
separatists (it is Kosovo ethnic cleaning in reverse - but then nobody in the world is bothered).
Pakistan feels that in the (mad) logic of partition, Kashmir should have reverted to its new nation,
as the Kashmir valley had a Muslim majority. There is no doubt in my mind that the only solution
to Kashmir is a rapprochement between India and Pakistan, a coming together of the two
brothers, who share the same cultures, the same languages, the same ethnic stocks, under some
kind of federation, where the other nations of South Asia would also find their place. After all, if
the two Germanies, the two Vietnams could do why not India and Pakistan?
Meanwhile, the government has to put across to the world that India is a great ancient and wise
civilisation - and a superpower in the making; and as future superpower, it is entitled to a little bit
more of respect and attention from the West and its press. But for that, you will have to bang
your fist on the table quite a few times "a la Chinoise:....
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