There are at least three different versions of Kashmiri history that have shaped the substance and direction of its nationalism.25 In one, Kashmiri culture is perceived as unique, distinctive, and separate from that of its neighboring regions; Kashmiri Islam is totally different from the practice of Islam in Pakistan, as the former's origins are to be found in the Sufi and Rishi traditions and not in the Wahaby Sunni tradition of the Islam of Pakistan and large parts of India. The nationalist movement against Dogra rule, led by Sheikh Abdullah and the National Conference party, and, half a century later, the movement for self- determination led by the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front, drew on this tradition. In the second version, Kashmiri identity is defined by virtue of the majority of the population being Muslim. It is argued by a small but highly vocal and now armed (with the help of Pakistan)segment of Kashmiris that Kashmir rightly belongs in Pakistan and that the partition of 1947 has left this matter unresolved. In the third, Kashmir's common, historic bonds with India and Hindu culture are stressed. In this version, Kashmir's tolerant and humane definition of Islam comes not only from its Sufi origins but from its permeation by Hindu customs and traditions. Kashmir's unique religion and culture can therefore be best preserved in a secular and democratic India. This view is held by Kashmir's Hindu population, some fraction of the Valley Muslims, and the vast majority of people in India. From time to time, It has also been espoused by various National Front leaders (i.e., Farooq Abdullah, J&K's chief minister in 1980s) and those of the Hindu parties in Jammu. For the sake of clarity, the first can be called a Kashmiri nationalist, the second, the Islamist; and the third, the Indian version of Kashmir's identity.
These conflicting narratives have been fiercely debated since the 1931 popular agitation against Dogra rule, and with greater urgency in 1946 and 1947, when the Hindu-Muslim divide deepened in the subcontinent. They were directly responsible for the armed clash between the emerging states of India and Pakistan immedaitely upon independence, and then again in 1965. The Islamist narrative has constited the subtext of all discussions of Kashmir in international fora ever since India took the Kashmir dispute to the Security Council in 1947. A large number of scholars in the west and a majority of journalists have seen the Kashmir problem as strictly a Hindu- Muslim problem. In this characterization, they have ignored the regional, ethnic, and even religious divisions within the Indian Kashmir. Instead, the paradigm of partition, that asserted the separate identity of the Hindu and Muslim nation, has dominated their thinking about the Kashmir dispute. The insurgency that began in 1989 over the status of Kashmir centered on conflict between the Kashmiri nationalist and the Indian versions of the past. This has been superimposed by the conflict between the pro- independence nationalists and the pro-Pakistani Islamists Kashmiris.
The relationship between the supranational Indian State and Kashmir is different from that between it and other ethnonationalities. While the valley of Kashmir, which has slightly more than half of the population of the State, can be identified as an ethnonational unit (of which both the Kashmiri pandits and the Muslim are an integral part), the people of the whole of the state cannot. The Indian state of J&K consists of three distinct regions: the valley of Kashmir, which is predominantly Muslim and accounts for the bulk of the population of the state; Jammu, which has a Hindu majority but also includes a significant Muslim minority, and Ladakh, which is sparsely populated and, unlike Jammu and the valley, is mainly Buddhist. Kashmir is also a multilingual state.26 Sheikh Abdullah's New Kashmir plan acknowledged several languages - Dogri, Punjabi, Urdu, Kashmiri, Balti - as the state languages. There is marked disparity in economic potential and development in the three regions. Kashmir lacks the compact, cultural homogeneity of other regions, i.e., Tamil Nadu. Any single linguistic or religious criterion of nationalism will exclude others who are now part of the J&K. This diversity has required Kashmiri nationalists to construct composite and syncretic accounts of historic and cultural unity.
Kashmir's territorial identity is equally problematic. The kingdom of Kashmir was the creation of the British. After the defeat of Sikh armies in 1846, the British imperial and strategic interests required establishment of regional rulers (under their paramountcy) who would act as a bulwark against revival of Sikh power, maintain stability in the entire tribal zone stretching all across what is now Indo-Chinese border to Baltistan, and serve as a buffer against China, Russia and Afghanistan. For this purpose, the British separated Kashmir and the hill states from Indus to the Beas from Punjab, and transferred them to Gulab Singh as a separate sovereign territory for the sum of 75 Lakhs of rupees. There was no 'natural' ethnic or linguistic unity to these territories. 27
Kashmir's territorial status was altered again in 1947 when the British decided to transfer power to Pakistan and India. According to the India Independence Act of 1947, the princes were free to choose independence, or, cede to one of the successor states. The Maharajah Hari Singh of Kashmir wanted independence but lacked the military and political power to make this a reality. Under the leadership of the National and Muslim Conference parties, Kashmiri masses had been agitating to depose the Maharajah since the early 1940s. 28 While the internal situation was unsettled, the partition and the Hindu-Muslim riots made it impossible for Maharajah Hari Singh to remain independent. Pakistan claimed Kashmir on the basis of its two-nation theory while India was reluctant to help the Maharajah without Kashmir's accession to the Union. In October 1947, when Pakistani raiders infiltrated into Kashmir followed by Pakistani regulars forces, the Maharajah hastily acceded to India in return for military support against the invading forces. At the conclusion of the armed confrontation in 1949, Kashmir was divided by a cease-fire line into the Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK ) and the Indian state of J&K. Sheikh Abdullah and his National Conference agreed to the instruments of accession with the condition that India would grant the state large degree of autonomy, an arrangement that was subsequently formalized in the Delhi agreement of 1952 and article 370 of the Indian constitution.29 In effect, India had recognized that Kashmir would exercise control over all subjects except on matters relating to foreign affairs, defense, and communication; in return for article 370, Sheikh Abdullah would accept the accession as final. But the legitimacy of Kashmiri consent, enshrined in the Delhi agreement has been periodically questioned even by one of its chief architects, Sheikh Abdullah.
The post-1950s internal polarization within Kashmir is equally important to the formation of Kashmir narrative. It must be stressed that with or without Sheikh Abdullah, the National Conference has dominated Kashmiri politics, particularly in the valley, while the Jammu Hindus have been divided between Praja Parishad, (closely linked to the Hindu Mahasabha, the RSS and more recently the BJP in India), and the Congress. Ladakh and Jammu (and not just the Hindu segment of the population) have resented the domination of National Conference and complained of "regional imbalances" in distribution of resources, employment, and educational opportunities. These regions would prefer to be integrated within India and regard the conference as anti-Hindu and anti-India. By the same token, the Muslim conference party before and after partition has had closer links with the Muslim League (in the 1940s) and later Jamaat-i-Islami and other similar forces in Pakistan. The National Conference's position in Kashmiri politics, which can be summed up as 'autonomy within a federal India,' is defined by the positions of the other political entities in the state: the Islamic pro-Pakistani position of the Muslim Conference in its various incarnations, and the Pro-integrationist position of the parties in Jammu and Ladakh.
Pakistan's claims regarding Kashmir have not changed since 1940s, but its enthusiasm for altering the status quo by diplomacy and force has waxed and waned depending on the balance of Pakistan's domestic politics. This too has had a profound impact on the nationalist discourse in Kashmir. Pakistan joined the western anti-Soviet containment alliance in the early 1950s and 1960s in order to deter India, and to maintain credibility for its position on Kashmir. The western powers rewarded Pakistan with military assistance and diplomatic support over Kashmir. With the incorporation of Pakistan in the western military alliance by the 1950s, India found it prudent to nurture its relations with the Soviet Union, which was only too eager to help with economic and military assistance to India. Indo-Soviet relations burgeoned into a close relationship by the early 1970s; they were however at a modest level in the 1950s and 1960s.
This situation was further complicated by the growing friendship between China and Pakistan, particularly after the 1962 Sino-Indian war. Pakistan Signed a border agreement with China in November 1963, delimiting their mutual borders between Wakkhan and Taghdumbash Pamir. This agreement adversely affected the talks that had sparked some hope for greater amicability between India and Pakistan. The border agreement brought the talks to an abrupt halt. India claimed that Pakistan had illegally transferred 2000 miles of territory which though 'disputed', had originally belonged to the State of Jammu and Kashmir. The Wakkhan corridor, the strip of border between China and Afghanistan, actually belonged to the later but in the Pakistani seizure of northern territories in 1947, the exact status of this stretch of territory became controversial. Sheikh Abdullah also strongly protested against the Sino-Pakistan border agreement on the grounds that the Wakkhan corridor was originally a part of the kingdom of Kashmir. Since the latter's status was still to be settled, Pakistan had no right, he argued, to cede Kashmiri territory. The validity of these claims and counter claims remain unsettled and as in case of all the border disputes between India and its neighbors subject to rival interpretation of British imperial policies before 1947.
Dispute over Kashmir led to a second war between India and Pakistan in 1965. Believing India to be in a state of disarray after Nehru's death in 1964, Pakistan made a second effort to wrest control by force.30 The third Indo-Pakistani war was not over the Kashmir issue but after Pakistan's military rout in 1971, Indira Gandhi sought to settle the issue once and for all. Kashmiri leaders were not party to the 1972 negotiations at Simla, where Mrs. Gandhi and Prime Minister Bhutto agreed to resolve Kashmir by bilateral negotiations, and promised to refrain from inviting third party mediation.31
Since the mid 1950s, the Indian state was never wholly free from external pressures to work out a stable interlocking balance with Kashmir. Once India conceded that Kashmir was a disputed territory, Pakistan, China, Soviet Union and the United States became involved. India has tried to maintain the territorial status quo established in 1949. Pakistan has tried to undo this status quo since then both conventional and unconventional means. It has brought the Kashmir dispute repeatedly before the United Nations to generate international pressure on India. It has enlisted diplomatic support from the United States and Britain to this end. It forged a close strategic relationship with China to intimidate India into a more accommodative stance. Failing in these, Pakistan has sought to foment a rebellion in Kashmir and provided logistical support and arms to Kashmiri separatists across the border. India has adhered more firmly to the status quo, sought to counter pressures from the United states and the United Nations, and progressively consolidated its control of politics inside the state of Jammu and Kashmir. Consolidation has inevitably meant loss of autonomy for the Kashmiris and their gradual integration into the Indian Union. Kashmiri nationalists have had little influence over the course of these developments, though they have been deeply affected by the changing balance of international forces around them. The rival Kashmiri perceptions of their own destiny have been kept in a continual flux by the interaction of these external influences with balance of political forces within Kashmir.
How have Kashmiri nationalist leaders sought to construct a coherent narrative in the face of such regional and territorial diversity, religious polarization, and international pressures? As mentioned, there is no single narrative. Existing narratives have been recast to accommodate the evolving balance of political and social forces within Kashmir. Nevertheless, one might suggest that Sheikh Abdullah and his interpretation of history and Kashmiri identity represent the master narrative of Kashmiri nation. The salient points of this interpretation can be described as follows.32
The first theme is: Kashmir is a distinctive cultural entity that can be traced back to antiquity, but for several centuries Kashmir has been enslaved and oppressed by powers surrounding it. The Kashmiri struggle for self-determination and justice reaches back into the distant past.33 In support of Kashmir's rich cultural heritage, Kashmiri nationalists stress the diverse streams of thought, philosophies and religions - Buddhism in 4th century B.C., indigenous Kashmiri Shaivism, followed by Vaishnavite influences and then Islam in the 14th century - that fed Kashmir and made it into a pre- eminent center of learning and arts. As evidence of Kashmir's long history of oppression and subjugation, nationalist historians stress the loss of freedom under the Mughal, Afghan, then Sikh rule, followed by the rule of the Dogra kings until 1947. The latter are portrayed as usurpers, foisted on the Kashmiri nation by the British imperialists. The Dogra kings are accused of vanity, greed and indifference to the people. Most importantly, they are portrayed as being anti-Muslim when a majority of their subjects happen to be Muslims. The Kashmiri Hindus, particularly the Pandits, are perceived as the privileged classes in this narrative. The nationalist history is rich with statistics and economic data supporting the charge that they have been discrimination against and exploitation by the feudal classes foisted by imperialists and nurtured by its successors. The Hindu Brahmin elite is perceived as the compliant and selfish collaborators of the Dogra court, helping to perpetuate this historic injustice and oppression. Clearly, the ideas of class conflict and imperialist exploitation have found a place of pride in the nationalist discourse. Liberal democracy and the right to self- determination are yet another source of ideas for their construction. These strains of ideas have greatly impressed the intellectuals and educated among the Kashmiri leaders. Ideas of resistance derived from the Quran complete the circle by connecting their Islamic identity to their present situation. At least initially, the three streams of ideas merged to create a formidable opposition to the Maharajah.
The mass upsurge of 1931 led by the Muslim Conference is fixed in the nationalist history as the date when the modern nation of Kashmir was born. The nationalists see the subsequent demand for self-determination and democracy as a natural outgrowth of the movement of 1931. Scholarly studies are however quick to point out that the Dogra state was not as coercive and repressive as the nationalist history suggests. By feudal standards, the Dogra rulers were fairly enlightened and tolerant. The landed Muslim classes were part of and were as supportive of the Dogra state as were its rich Hindu supporters. There was no Muslim 'community' of interests nor were Muslim masses perennially alienated and disaffected from the Dogra dynasty. Most importantly, there was no Muslim middle class or a large educated elite that could have caused the 1931 upsurge. According to Zutshi, the causes of the upsurge are multiple, and embedded in the British colonial imperialism. "It is within this framework that a whole cobweb of . . . contradictions, and conflicts developed and resulted in the dawn of political awakening in Kashmir.34
If the first theme to nurture the Kashmiri nationalist is the struggle against imposition of outside rule, the second theme is the distinctive nature of Kashmiri Islam. Two arguments are important in this regard: the tolerant, religious humanism of Kashmiri Islam, and the composite nature of Kashmiri culture which is the natural outcome of a humanist Islam. P.N. Bazaz writes, that Kashmiri Islam was deeply influenced by the Sufi mystical, devotional tradition of Central Asia and Iran. According to P.N.K. Bamzai, "Kashmir thus became a meeting place of two . . . traditions - India's monistic wisdom- religion, Saivism and Efran, the wisdom of Quran." This "resulted in the emergence of a remarkable school of order of Islamic Sufis- the Rishis- who exerted enormous influence on the . . . people and set up the ideal of religious tolerance. As in religion so in philosophy, art and literature Kashmir evolved a composite culture." 35 Kashmiri nationalist often quote Sir Walter Lawrence to show that Hindus and Muslims borrowed and imitated each others customs and food habits to the point that orthodox Brahmins of India would have been horrified just as orthodox (meaning textual Quranic Islam) Muslims would have considered Kashmiris beyond the pale of their religion.
This theme is central to the construction of Kashmiri territorial nationalism. If the Kingdom of Kashmir is to be the home of such a nation, then it must include Hindu and Buddhist population within its fold. Even after the cease-fire in 1949, Kashmiri nationalism needed to reconcile Muslim, Hindu, and Buddhist claims on J&K's territory. This is the main reason why Sheikh Abdullah changed the name of the Muslim Conference to the National conference in 1938 and redefined nationalist platform to be secular, socialist, and democratic. He was undoubtedly influenced by Nehru and Gandhi, but the choice was also dictated by the desire to make Kashmir a modern nation state. The demand for Kashmiri self-determination was not confined to cultural and social freedom, at least not before the accession. Even then, Sheikh Abdullah continued to talk about making Kashmir an Asian Switzerland - independent but neutral. This same nationalistic impulse was evident in his 1946 New Kashmir plan, which defined Kashmir's problems in terms of exploitation of Hindu and Muslim masses and amelioration of their condition as Kashmiris. This perception was also one of the bases for two demands that have subsequently shaped the course of Kashmiri nationalism: article 370 of the Indian constitution that bars Indian citizens from acquiring property or settling down in Kashmir and, second, the delinking of Kashmiri Muslims from Muslims in India. Sheikh Abdullah maintained that Indian Muslims had no say in what Kashmiris ultimately decide for themselves.36
This interpretation was challenged continually from within and outside Kashmir. The pro-Pakistani, conservative and radical Islamic elements saw in Sheikh's stance a desire for personal power and worse, surrender to Hindu India. Pakistani leaders often called Sheikh Abdullah a 'quisling' of India. They changed their assessment once he was arrested but until then Pakistan never forgave Sheikh Abdullah for supporting Kashmir's accession to India. The Jammu Hindus, dominated in the 1950s and 1960s by Praja Parishad and since the late 1980s by radical parties such as the Jammu Mukti Morcha, Jammu Mahasabha, and Jammu People Front, also see in his stance an attempt to deny Hindus any share of power in Kashmir.37 Ironically enough, they see the National conference leaders as potential fifth columnists who exploit India's fear of Kashmir's Muslim majority and of Pakistan to milk New Delhi of large sums of money.
The third theme 'explains' the legal basis of Kashmir's original decision and why this legal basis no longer applies. The Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (the JKLF) has put forward this justification to launch the armed insurgency against the Indian government. But even moderate leaders like Sheikh Abdullah have argued that the 1947 accession was a 'temporary' agreement necessitated by the Pakistani invasion but that India "cleverly" turned that into a permanent situation. Despite this, the Kashmiri nation trusted India because the latter was committed to secularism, democracy, and federalism. Article 370 and the Delhi agreement thus became the basis of that union. This basis was progressively eroded, until only a skeleton of article 370 remained. The Indian arguments that subsequent tests at the polls legitimized the power arrangements are also rejected as fraudulent by the Kashmiri nationalists; they charge that the political parties that participated in the elections to the J&K's Constituent Assembly were dominated by the Congress party. In their view, the Kashmiris never consented to the progressive erosion of their autonomy38.
The refrain of betrayal by India, of promises broken, of leaders jailed, and of manipulation and interference in Kashmir's internal affairs, has grown shrill with the passage of time. As a subtext, economic discrimination, anti-Muslim bias in recruitment to central government and private sector jobs, nepotism, cronyism, and large scale corruption have also become part of the nationalist protest. Added since 1989 to this long list of grievances are human rights violations, charges of an indiscriminate search, molestation and rape, and the murder of civilians by the Indian security forces.
Religious identities are particularly significant in the competing discourses about Kashmiri identity. The slogan of 'Islam in danger' has the potential for unleashing serious social disturbances within the J&K. This was evident in the 1963 episode involving the holy Mosque of Hazaratbal in Srinagar. The disappearance of the hair of the prophet Mohammed triggered riots and to the formation of the Awami Action committee led by the Mir Waiz of Kashmir, spiritual leader of the Muslims in the valley. More recently, several developments within and around Kashmir have strengthened the Islamic identity of the valley Muslims: the inspiration derived from the Islamic revolution in Iran, the emergence of militant Islamic groups fighting against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, and the enormous increase in the schools - madrasa and institutions geared to Islamic fundamentalist propaganda. Kadian writes, "senior Indian officials began to notice the increasing number of Maulavis [Mulim religious leaders] from U.P. and Bihar in the local mosques and madrasas. These new maulavis did not share the gentle Sufism of their indigenous Kashmiri brethren for most of them were young and educated in the Deoband region of western U.P. They taught of pride in militant Islam and branded Muslim children going to secular schools as Kafirs. Their teachings struck a ready chord in a population already stimulated by Islamic revolution in neighboring Iran." 39 According to Wani, the Jama'at had set up 125 Islamic schools with an enrollment of 17,000 students.40 Sheikh Abdullah was aware of the political danger in increasing Islamization and tried to stem the tide by banning Madrasas[Mulim schools], but there were other political parties, i.e., the Awami Action Party led by Maulavi Farooq, which quietly promoted the Islamic cause to politically weaken the NC and its leaders. Likewise, New Delhi played upon the apprehensions of the Hindus around Jammu about being overwhelmed by the Muslim majority in the state.
Echoing the opinion of many experts, Gull Mohd. Wani writes that, although failure of the democratic and secular forces have "paved the way for the emergence of Islam as an alternative source of inspiration for the masses, it was only after the consolidation of Zia's regime in Pakistan and Islamic revolutionary struggles . . . in Iran and Afghanistan that Kashmir also witnessed Islamic resurgence. It is Jama'at-i-Islami of Kashmir which became a bridge connecting Kashmir with the overall Islamic resurgence . . . the collapse of communism as the leading anti-Western ideology seems to propel Islam into this role."41 Both in theory and practice, the Jama'at forces of Kashmir and Pakistan have much in common. Both reject 'Indian Colonialism' and 'Brahminical Imperialism' and wish to establish an Islamic state in their respective spheres.
One of the best sources of Islamic discourse in Kashmir can be gleaned from the writings of Syed Ali Shah Geelani one of Jama'at's prominent leaders. Referring to Sheikh Abdullah, he complains that "Since 1931 we have been playing with our blood but the leader in whom we reposed out trust betrayed us." Turning to the youth of Kashmir, he declares, "You, the nation of Kashmiri Muslims, how long will you continue to remain easy going slaves! Your enemies are bent upon destroying your identity and faith, they are pressing in full strength with their army and weapons. If you ignore this warning, be sure that the history of Muradabad will be repeated here. Like the lands of Bhiwandi, Aligarh, Hyderabad and Assam, your lands would also be dyed with blood. You are facing a ruthless imperialist power whose Brahminical psyche is bringing new troubles for you every day. If you don't understand even now, you will not find any place in the pages of history." 42
The Kashmiri Hindus likewise seek to unify the Pandit community in the valley and Jammu around the themes of Hindu identity and Indian nationalism. The communal perception in Kashmir reflects an interesting paradox. The Hindus are a minority in Kashmir but the Kashmiri Muslims see them as the extension of the Hindu majority in India; the Kashmiri Muslims are a majority in the J&K, but see themselves as an oppressed minority that must protect its identity by maintaining a distance from New Delhi. Among these rival discourses of identity the Islamic militant variant is definitely winning the hearts and minds of the people in the state in the 1990s.
A caveat needs to be entered here. Contrary to the portrayals of continuous strife and struggle in the nationalist and Islamic accounts of Kashmir's history, there were large periods of relative calm and cooperation in J&K's relations with New Delhi. Kashmir has not been in a state of continuing turmoil or in a mode of permanent protest, although this is what the narratives have emphasized. The main purpose of the nationalist was to reconstruct the past to legitimize their power in the future. They were eminently successful until the militancy undermined the moderate nationalist rationale for remaining within India. This happened mainly because of the erosion of interlocking balances and New Delhi's failure to democratically integrate the J&K within the Indian union. The story of this failure is the subject of later chapters. Here it will be enough to note that contradictions inherent in their ideology have put Kashmiri nationalists on the horns of a painful dilemma. They can mobilize transborder support from POK or Pakistan and raise the stakes in their struggle against the Indian government. But they can only do so at the expense of their Kashmiriyat or "composite nationalism." Since that is also the basis of their territorial claim, Islamization of Kashmiri nationalism challenges the very rationale that supports the nationalist claims to the Hindu and Buddhist dominated areas of the kingdom of Kashmir.
The politics of identity in Kashmir is shaped by several pairs of conflicts: between Hindus and Muslims within the state of J&K; between Islamic militants and Kashmiri nationalists, many of whom support complete independence to political autonomy; between India and the Kashmiri nation; between India and Pakistan, and between India and its international friends on the one hand, and Pakistan and its supporters on the Kashmir issue on the other.